Vessel Deviation During War and Armed Conflict: An Examination of the Rights of Cargo Interests and Shipping Companies

In the Name of God

Introduction

International maritime transport has always been exposed to various risks, including adverse weather conditions, maritime casualties, piracy and, in recent years, an increase in armed conflicts and military threats.

During war or periods of heightened risk arising from armed conflict, a vessel’s contractually agreed route may no longer be safe for navigation. Under such circumstances, the shipowner or Master may decide to alter the vessel’s route, refuse to enter a port, select an alternative port of discharge, or follow a longer but safer route to reach the destination.

In maritime law, such a departure from the intended route is known as Deviation.

However, two important questions arise: Does a shipowner have an unrestricted right to deviate from the agreed route during wartime? Conversely, what rights do cargo interests have when a deviation results in delays, additional costs or a change in the port of discharge?

The answers depend on the contract of carriage, the Bill of Lading, the Charterparty, the applicable legal rules, the relevant War Risks Clause and the actual circumstances prevailing in the area of danger.

An essential distinction must be established at the outset: the relationship between the shipowner and the Charterer is governed by the Charterparty, whereas the relationship between the carrier and the Bill of Lading holder (cargo interests) is governed by the Bill of Lading. Cargo interests are generally not parties to the Charterparty, and its provisions affect them only where those provisions have been validly incorporated into the Bill of Lading [7]. This distinction must be borne in mind throughout this article whenever the rights of cargo interests are discussed.

1. The Concept of Deviation in Maritime Carriage

In general terms, Deviation means a vessel’s departure from the contractually agreed or customary route of a voyage.

The vessel’s route is ordinarily determined by the contract of carriage, the Bill of Lading or the Charterparty. Where a vessel departs from that route without legal or contractual justification, the deviation may have significant consequences for the carrier’s liability.

A distinction must therefore be drawn between two categories:

• Justified Deviation: A deviation that can be justified under applicable law, contractual provisions, maritime custom or emergency circumstances.
• Unjustified Deviation: A departure from the agreed route without a valid legal or contractual basis and in breach of the carrier’s obligations.

This distinction becomes particularly important during wartime.

Under English common law, an unjustified deviation has historically been regarded as a particularly serious breach of contract, potentially depriving the carrier of the right to rely on contractual exceptions and limitations of liability [4]. Although the precise scope of this principle has been debated following subsequent developments in contract law, it remains a principal reason for the legal significance of Deviation.

2. Why War Makes Deviation More Significant

Consider a vessel contractually required to follow the route:

Port A → Red Sea → Suez Canal → Port B

During the voyage, missile attacks or threats against merchant vessels increase. The shipowner is then confronted with two potentially conflicting obligations.

On the one hand, the vessel must perform the voyage in accordance with the agreed contractual route. On the other hand, the shipowner and Master have a duty to consider the safety of the vessel, crew and cargo.

Under such circumstances, a decision may be made to reroute the vessel as follows:

Port A → Cape of Good Hope → Port B

This alternative route may add several days or even weeks to the voyage, increasing bunker consumption, crew costs, insurance premiums and other operating expenses.

Consequently, a decision to deviate is not merely an operational decision; it also has legal, contractual, insurance and commercial implications.

3. Is Deviation Permissible During War?

There is no absolute answer.

Under maritime law, Article IV, Rule 4 of the Hague-Visby Rules provides that any deviation in saving or attempting to save life or property at sea, or any reasonable deviation, shall not be deemed an infringement or breach of the Rules or the contract of carriage. Subject to the applicable conditions, the carrier shall not be liable for loss or damage resulting from such deviation [1].

The wording of this provision is identical in the 1924 Hague Rules and the Hague-Visby Rules.

In Iranian law, the provisions governing carrier liability under the Iranian Maritime Law of 1964 (1343 in the Iranian calendar) were derived from the 1924 Hague Rules [21]. Accordingly, the concept of reasonable deviation may also be invoked in carriage governed by Iranian law. The precise statutory article number should be verified against the official text of the legislation.

The central legal concept is therefore Reasonable Deviation.

However, whether a deviation is reasonable must be assessed in light of the actual circumstances of the voyage.

The traditional test was articulated by the House of Lords in Stag Line Ltd v Foscolo, Mango & Co Ltd: a deviation is reasonable where it is one that a prudent carrier, having regard to the interests of all parties concerned in the contractual adventure, would undertake [3].

Similarly, the classic decision in Scaramanga v Stamp established that deviation to save human life is always justified, whereas deviation to save property is justified only to the extent required by necessity [2].

For example, where an area is seriously exposed to military attacks, selecting a longer but safer route may have an entirely different legal character from changing the route solely to reduce costs or increase commercial profit.

4. Shipowners’ Rights in War Risk Situations

Many Charterparties, particularly standard industry forms, contain War Risks Clauses.

These clauses are generally designed to address circumstances in which continuing a voyage, entering a port or transiting a particular area would expose the vessel, crew or cargo to war risks.

Under standard BIMCO clauses, such as VOYWAR and CONWARTIME, the rights of the shipowner and Master in the presence of War Risks may include refusing to comply with certain orders, altering the voyage route or, in specified circumstances, selecting another safe port.

Sub-clause (g) of VOYWAR 2004 expressly provides that actions taken or not taken in compliance with the clause shall not be deemed a Deviation and shall be considered due fulfilment of the contract of carriage [5].

In The Triton Lark (English Commercial Court, 2011), where the Time Charter incorporated CONWARTIME 2004 and the Voyage Sub-Charter incorporated VOYWAR 2004, the Court examined the test governing reliance on these clauses to refuse transit through the Gulf of Aden and instead proceed around the Cape of Good Hope [6].

The latest editions of these clauses are VOYWAR 2025 and CONWARTIME 2025.

Among their practical differences, the period allowed for the Charterer to nominate an alternative safe port has increased from 48 hours under the 2013 editions to 72 hours under the 2025 editions [16].

Furthermore, CONWARTIME covers both risks existing when the contract is concluded and risks arising subsequently, whereas VOYWAR, in its earlier editions, does not apply where the relevant risk already existed at the time of contracting [16].

It is therefore essential to identify the exact edition of the clause incorporated into the Charterparty.

In any dispute, the first document to examine is the Charterparty, followed by the Bill of Lading.

5. The Master’s Role in Deciding to Deviate

A Master cannot change the vessel’s route at will merely because of a remote possibility of danger.

Equally, a Master cannot reasonably be expected to navigate a vessel into an area presenting a serious and reasonably foreseeable threat to the lives of the crew, the vessel or the cargo.

For this reason, many War Risks Clauses employ expressions such as “reasonable judgment of the Master and/or Owners.”

This means that the decision must be based on a rational and professional assessment of the relevant risks.

In The Triton Lark, the Court identified three requirements for such reasonable judgment:

1. The judgment must be exercised in good faith, rather than as a pretext for obtaining financial advantage.
2. The judgment must be objectively reasonable.
3. The shipowner must have made all necessary enquiries before reaching the decision.

The Court also clarified that the expression “may be, or are likely to be exposed to war risks” refers to a single degree of probability: a real likelihood, rather than a merely remote possibility [6].

In practice, warnings issued by War Risk insurers, Flag States, maritime security authorities and specialist risk-assessment organisations constitute important documentary evidence supporting the reasonableness of the shipowner’s decision [19].

BIMCO expressly recommends documenting the risk assessment in writing at the time the decision is made [18].

Accordingly, in disputes concerning deviation, the decisive question is not necessarily whether the vessel was actually attacked.

Rather, the question may be whether, at the time of the decision, there were reasonable grounds for concluding that a relevant danger existed.

This distinction is legally significant.

6. The Rights of Cargo Interests in Relation to Deviation

Cargo interests also possess contractual rights and do not automatically lose those rights merely because war exists.

A deviation may expose cargo interests to consequences including:

• Delayed delivery;
• Increased freight and storage costs;
• A change in the port of discharge and transshipment to another vessel or means of transport;
• Additional inland transportation costs;
• Potential cargo damage and increased insurance costs; and
• In certain circumstances, a reduction in the commercial value of the cargo.

A balance must therefore be maintained between the shipowner’s right to safeguard the vessel and the contractual rights of cargo interests.

7. Deviation and Delay in Cargo Delivery

One of the most significant consequences of wartime Deviation is an increase in voyage duration.

For example, if the normal voyage takes 20 days and the alternative route takes 35 days, cargo interests may receive their goods 15 days later than originally anticipated.

However, does this delay alone make the shipowner liable for damages?

The answer depends on the contract and the applicable legal framework.

Where the deviation is undertaken pursuant to a valid War Risks Clause and in response to a genuine and justifiable danger, its legal consequences will differ from those of an unsupported or unauthorised deviation.

Guidance issued by P&I Clubs in 2026 also emphasises that rights and obligations arising from Deviation must be assessed by reference to the Charterparty and the relevant War Risks Clauses.

Whether delays are for the shipowner’s or Charterer’s account is among the questions that must be answered by examining the contractual wording [16][18].

8. Change of Port of Discharge

One of the most complex situations arises when the contractually agreed port is no longer safe.

Assume that the contract specifies:

Discharge Port: Port A

However, because of war or military attacks, entering Port A becomes dangerous.

In such circumstances, the shipowner may request the Charterer to nominate another safe port.

If the Charterer fails to nominate a suitable port, certain War Risks Clauses may, subject to specified conditions, permit the shipowner to discharge the cargo at another safe port.

Correction of legal reference: An earlier version of this discussion referred to The Herculito as authority for this issue. However, the principal issue in that case concerned General Average rather than discharge at an alternative safe port (see Section 12).

The more relevant authorities are:

• The Houda: Where a Charterer insists on an order requiring entry into a dangerous area, that order is likely to be unlawful, and the vessel remains on hire while awaiting lawful instructions [10][19].
• The 2026 published arbitration concerning VOYWAR 1993: The arbitral tribunal found that the Charterer had breached the War Risks Clause by failing to nominate an effective alternative safe port within the required period. The tribunal awarded detention damages to the shipowner at the demurrage rate. The Charterer’s frustration argument was also rejected because the clause itself contemplated the consequences of the relevant circumstances [12].
• The concept of a Safe Port: The classic definition in The Eastern City and the more recent analysis by the UK Supreme Court in The Ocean Victory [11].

These authorities demonstrate that such disputes cannot be resolved through a single general rule.

The precise wording of the Charterparty is fundamental.

9. Who Pays the Additional Costs of an Alternative Route?

One of the principal commercial disputes arising after Deviation concerns responsibility for the costs of the alternative route.

Additional expenditure may include:

• Increased bunker consumption and additional vessel time;
• Crew costs and War Risk insurance premiums;
• Security expenses and port charges;
• Rerouting costs and additional inland transportation expenses; and
• Costs arising from a change in the port of discharge.

Under certain standard Charterparties, the War Risks Clause expressly allocates particular additional costs to the Charterer.

For example, under sub-clause (e)(ii) of VOYWAR 2004, where insurers require an additional premium because the vessel enters an area subject to additional War Risk premiums, the Charterer must reimburse the shipowner within 14 days of receiving the relevant invoice [5].

In The Herculito, the War Risks Clause similarly placed responsibility for additional insurance premiums on the Charterer.

However, the UK Supreme Court held that this arrangement did not, by itself, prevent the shipowner from recovering General Average contributions from cargo interests [7].

Therefore, the answer to the question of who bears the additional costs must first be determined from the Charterparty.

10. Insurance and Deviation

This section is directly connected to the issue discussed in the author’s previous article concerning the confusion between CMR and insurance.

Deviation may have significant insurance implications.

Ordinary vessel insurance or P&I cover may contain specific conditions relating to a departure from the agreed voyage route.

Certain P&I Clubs expressly warn that Deviation may constitute a breach of the contract of carriage and result in the loss of P&I cover. Members are therefore advised to contact their Club before commencing a deviation [16].

War Risks are also generally insured under separate arrangements or subject to particular terms, conditions and limitations.

In 2026, the London P&I Club cancelled War Risk cover for Fixed Premium and Charterers’ entries in the Persian Gulf and adjacent waters, including the Gulf of Oman [17].

The West of England P&I Club also received cancellation notices from its reinsurers concerning War Risk liabilities in Iranian waters and the Persian Gulf. However, this exclusion did not extend to Mutual P&I and Freight, Demurrage and Defence (FD&D) cover [16].

Under English marine insurance law, Section 46 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 provides that an unjustified deviation discharges the insurer from liability from the time of deviation, while Section 49 specifies circumstances in which deviation is excused [13].

Modern policy clauses have modified the operation of this rule, frequently subject to prompt notification to insurers.

The essential distinction is therefore:

A legal or contractual right to deviate is not the same as insurance cover for that deviation.

11. Cargo Interests Should Not Rely on the Shipowner’s Insurance

A common misconception among cargo interests is that, because the vessel is insured, the cargo is necessarily fully covered under all circumstances.

This assumption is incorrect.

Cargo interests must review their own cargo insurance arrangements and determine:

• Whether the alternative route remains covered;
• Whether War Risks are insured and whether cargo cover continues while the goods are in a war zone;
• Whether the deviation must be notified to the insurer;
• Whether an extended voyage duration affects cover; and
• Whether discharge at an alternative port remains insured.

The principal references for these questions include the Institute Cargo Clauses (A) 2009, particularly Clause 8 (Transit Clause) and Clause 10 (Change of Voyage), together with the Institute War Clauses (Cargo), under which War Risk cover is generally confined to the waterborne transit [14].

It should be noted that the Institute Cargo Clauses (A) exclude War Risks.

In The Polar, the cargo was insured on these terms, with piracy alone excepted from the relevant exclusion [7].

During wartime, these matters must be examined both before the voyage commences and whenever the relevant circumstances change.

12. General Average and War Risk

Certain wartime incidents may also give rise to General Average (GA).

For example, where extraordinary expenditure is incurred for the common safety of the vessel and cargo, circumstances may arise that justify a declaration of General Average.

GA adjustment is generally undertaken in accordance with the York-Antwerp Rules, specifically the edition incorporated by reference into the Bill of Lading [15].

This issue arose in The Herculito.

In 2010, the vessel Polar was hijacked by Somali pirates in the Gulf of Aden. Following payment of a ransom, the shipowner declared General Average.

Cargo interests argued that because the Charterer had paid additional War Risk and Kidnap and Ransom insurance premiums, an implied “insurance code” existed under which the shipowner was required to seek recovery exclusively from insurers.

In January 2024, the UK Supreme Court rejected that argument and held that cargo interests were required to contribute to the General Average expenditure relating to the ransom [7].

The practical implication for cargo interests is that payment of additional War Risk insurance premiums by the Charterer does not exempt cargo interests from their General Average contribution.

Where the parties intend to establish co-insurance arrangements for War Risks, those arrangements must be expressly and unambiguously provided for in the contract [7].

Accordingly, during wartime, the legal relationships between Cargo Damage, War Risk, Deviation, Insurance and General Average must be examined separately.

13. Can the Shipowner Discharge Cargo at Any Alternative Port?

No. This right is not unrestricted.

The existence of War Risks may provide grounds for changing the port of discharge, but the contractual terms, the applicable War Risks Clause, the actual conditions at the port and the availability of safe access to the alternative destination must all be considered.

Under certain Charterparties, if the Charterer fails to nominate a safe port, the shipowner may be entitled, subject to specified conditions, to select another safe port.

Under other contracts, the shipowner’s rights may be more limited.

The shipowner must also comply strictly with the procedural requirements of the relevant clause, including written notices and requests for fresh orders within the prescribed period.

Failure to comply may itself constitute a breach of contract [18].

The fundamental principle is therefore that a War Risks Clause must be examined as a separate and precisely worded contractual provision.

The mere existence of war does not create unrestricted rights for either the shipowner or the Charterer.

14. The Importance of the Charterparty During War

Under normal market conditions, contracting parties may focus primarily on practical and commercial considerations.

During wartime, however, even minor differences in contractual wording may have financial consequences amounting to millions of dollars.

Accordingly, before commencing a voyage, the parties should examine at least the following provisions:

• War Risks Clause, including its exact edition (2004, 2013 or 2025);
• Safe Port Clause;
• Deviation Clause;
• Sanctions Clause;
• Insurance Clause;
• General Average Clause;
• Discharge Clause;
• Delay Clause;
• Additional War Risk Premium provisions; and
• Right to Refuse Orders.

The UK Supreme Court articulated a particularly important principle in The Polar.

Where the Charterparty expressly provides for transit through a specified route, such as “via Suez”, thereby contemplating passage through the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, the shipowner cannot rely on the general powers contained in a War Risks Clause to refuse that route and proceed around the Cape of Good Hope unless there has been a qualitative change in the nature or degree of the risk since the Charterparty was concluded [7].

In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court endorsed the principles established in The Product Star and the reasoning in The Paiwan Wisdom [8][9].

According to The Paiwan Wisdom, where a shipowner has contractually accepted a particular known War Risk, the shipowner will generally not be entitled to refuse to proceed to the relevant area [20].

Recent judicial decisions likewise emphasise the importance of the specific Charterparty wording.

A single uniform rule cannot be applied to every contract of maritime carriage.

15. Recent Developments and Their Significance for the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz

This subject has acquired particular significance under current circumstances.

With increasing military tensions in the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz and adjacent areas, shipping companies must examine the applicable War Risks, insurance arrangements, Charterparty provisions and operational instructions before entering the region.

Following the attacks of 28 February 2026 and the subsequent retaliatory actions, commercial shipping through the Persian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden was severely disrupted, while P&I Clubs redefined the geographical scope of their War Risk cover [17].

On 3 March 2026, BIMCO advised contracting parties to review the provisions of VOYWAR 2025 and CONWARTIME 2025 and to document their decisions [18].

An important legal distinction arises here.

For Charterparties concluded before 28 February 2026, the occurrence of a fundamental change in risk, within the meaning of the test in The Polar, is clear.

However, the assessment becomes more difficult for contracts concluded after that date, particularly as circumstances evolve and tensions subsequently decrease [19].

The vessel’s flag and the connections of the shipowner or cargo with countries involved in the conflict may also affect the reasonableness of the shipowner’s judgment [19].

These circumstances demonstrate that Deviation is no longer merely a theoretical issue in maritime law.

It has become an everyday operational and legal consideration for shipping companies and cargo interests.

16. A Practical Scenario

Assume that a vessel carrying 2,500 containers is sailing from East Asia to Europe.

The contractually agreed route is:

Asia → Red Sea → Suez Canal → Europe

During the voyage, attacks against merchant vessels intensify.

The shipowner decides to reroute the vessel around the Cape of Good Hope.

This decision results in an additional 12 to 18 days of sailing, increased bunker consumption, higher crew costs, increased insurance expenditure, delayed cargo delivery, a revised Estimated Time of Arrival (ETA), and potentially higher supply-chain costs.

Additional legal analysis:

In this scenario, the vessel operates within a Liner Shipping service.

The relationship between cargo interests and the carrier is governed by the shipping line’s Bill of Lading, particularly its Liberty Clause, rather than by the Charterparty.

The Charterparty, where one exists, governs only the relationship between the shipowner and the liner operator.

Accordingly, Questions 1, 3 and 5 below, insofar as they concern cargo interests, must be answered by reference to the terms of the Bill of Lading.

War Risks provisions contained in the Charterparty affect cargo interests only where they have been validly incorporated into the Bill of Lading [7].

Five fundamental questions arise:

1. Was the shipowner entitled under the Charterparty, or the carrier under the Bill of Lading, to alter the route?
2. Was the existing danger sufficiently serious to render the Deviation reasonable?
3. Who must bear the additional costs of the alternative route?
4. Does the shipowner’s insurance, including P&I cover, extend to the new route?
5. Can cargo interests pursue a claim for delay or additional expenses?

The answers to all five questions may depend on the contractual wording and the particular circumstances of the voyage.

17. Practical Answers to the Five Questions

Question 1: Was the shipowner entitled to alter the route?

Where the Charterparty contains a valid War Risks Clause, the answer will generally be yes, but subject to conditions.

The shipowner or Master may be entitled to refuse entry into a dangerous area, change the route or select another safe port.

However, the requirements of the relevant clause must be complied with.

An important exception arises where the route was expressly agreed in the contract and the relevant risk was known when the contract was concluded.

In such circumstances, the shipowner is entitled to deviate only where a qualitative change in the risk has occurred [7].

Therefore, the existence of war alone does not confer an unlimited right to deviate.

Question 2: Was the danger sufficiently serious to justify a reasonable deviation?

Where the danger is real, serious and capable of being substantiated, the answer is likely to be yes.

The relevant test is not simply whether the vessel was actually attacked.

Rather, it is whether the information available at the time of the decision would have indicated a serious danger to a prudent and reasonable shipowner or Master.

The assessment requires good faith, objective reasonableness and the completion of necessary enquiries [6].

However, where the shipowner changes the route solely to reduce insurance costs or increase its own profits, justification becomes considerably more difficult.

Question 3: Who bears the additional costs of the alternative route?

This is primarily a contractual question.

It cannot be stated as a general rule that the shipowner always pays or that the Charterer always bears the costs.

The Charterparty must be examined, together with the Bill of Lading and the shipping line’s announced surcharges in the case of liner carriage.

Question 4: Does the shipowner’s insurance and P&I cover extend to the alternative route?

Not necessarily.

The existence of P&I cover does not mean that every Deviation or War Risk is automatically insured.

Contractual entitlement to deviate ≠ insurance cover for the deviation.

A shipowner may be contractually entitled to alter the route but may nevertheless be required to pay an additional premium or provide prior notification to the P&I Club in order to maintain insurance cover [16].

Question 5: Can cargo interests bring a claim?

Potentially, yes.

However, delay resulting from a justified Deviation does not necessarily give rise to an entitlement to damages.

Where the Deviation is authorised, reasonable, attributable to genuine War Risks and consistent with the contract, the position of cargo interests in pursuing a claim may be weaker.

Conversely, where the shipowner deviates without contractual entitlement, without genuine danger and in breach of the contract, cargo interests may be able to pursue claims for delay, additional expenditure or other losses [4].

Any such claim remains subject to the applicable contractual terms and governing law.

18. Conclusion

Deviation during wartime is among the most complex issues in maritime transport law because it lies at the intersection of three competing interests:

• The safety of the vessel and crew;
• The contractual rights of the shipowner and Charterer; and
• The rights of cargo interests.

A shipowner cannot alter the agreed route merely to protect commercial profits without sufficient justification.

Equally, the shipowner cannot reasonably be expected to expose the vessel and crew to serious War Risks.

In this context, the Hague-Visby Rules recognise the concept of Reasonable Deviation [1], while many modern Charterparties contain specific War Risks Clauses intended to address wartime circumstances [5].

Cargo interests, for their part, must recognise that a change of route does not necessarily constitute a breach of the contract of carriage.

In many cases, where Deviation is legally or contractually authorised and undertaken reasonably, the scope for objection or recovery of damages may be limited.

Cargo interests must also understand that even where the Charterer has paid War Risk-related costs, they may remain liable for their contribution to General Average [7].

The most important principle during wartime is therefore that the safety of the vessel, crew and cargo must be considered alongside contractual obligations and the rights of cargo interests within a unified legal and commercial framework.

From a practical perspective, the mere presence of the expressions “War Risk” or “Deviation” in a contract is never sufficient.

The precise wording of the Charterparty, Bill of Lading, War Risks Clause and insurance policies must be examined together with the actual conditions prevailing in the area of danger.

Ultimately, the most effective risk-management approach for shipping companies and cargo interests is to establish clearly, before a vessel enters a high-risk area, the respective rights of the shipowner, Charterer, Master and Cargo Interests, together with the costs and insurance implications of any alternative route.

Disclaimer

All matters discussed in this article are presented on the basis of different possibilities and scenarios. All conclusions are subject to detailed examination by a qualified specialist lawyer and a review of the contracts concluded between Charterers, cargo interests and shipping companies, as well as the provisions of each Bill of Lading, particularly under crisis and wartime conditions.

References

[1] International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law relating to Bills of Lading (Hague Rules), Brussels 1924, as amended by the Visby Protocol 1968 — Art. IV, Rule 4.

[2] Scaramanga & Co v Stamp (1880) 5 CPD 295 (CA).

[3] Stag Line Ltd v Foscolo, Mango & Co Ltd [1932] AC 328 (HL).

[4] Hain Steamship Co Ltd v Tate & Lyle Ltd (1936) 41 Com Cas 350 (HL).

[5] BIMCO, War Risks Clause for Voyage Chartering 2004 (VOYWAR 2004), sub-clauses (e)(ii) and (g); latest edition: War Risks Clause for Voyage Charter Parties 2025.
https://www.bimco.org/contractual-affairs/bimco-clauses/earlier-clauses-list/war_risks_clause_for_voyage_chartering_2004/

[6] Pacific Basin IHX Ltd v Bulkhandling Handymax AS (The Triton Lark) [2011] EWHC 2862 (Comm); [2012] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 151. Summary: HFW, “CONWARTIME 2004 – Was the long way round the wrong way round” (November 2011).

[7] Herculito Maritime Ltd v Gunvor International BV (The Polar) [2024] UKSC 2, 17 January 2024.
https://caselaw.nationalarchives.gov.uk/uksc/2024/2

[8] Abu Dhabi National Tanker Co v Product Star Shipping Ltd (The Product Star) (No 2) [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 397 (CA).

[9] Taokas Navigation SA v Komrowski Bulk Shipping KG (The Paiwan Wisdom) [2012] EWHC 1888 (Comm).

[10] Kuwait Petroleum Corp v I & D Oil Carriers Ltd (The Houda) [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 541 (CA).

[11] Leeds Shipping Co v Société Française Bunge (The Eastern City) [1958] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 127; Gard Marine & Energy Ltd v China National Chartering Co Ltd (The Ocean Victory) [2017] UKSC 35.

[12] Steamship Mutual, “VOYWAR 1993: Alternative Voyage Orders and Frustration” (29 June 2026).
https://www.steamshipmutual.com/jp/node/190241

[13] Marine Insurance Act 1906 (UK), Sections 46 and 49.

[14] Institute Cargo Clauses (A) 1/1/2009, Clauses 8 and 10; Institute War Clauses (Cargo) 1/1/2009.

[15] York-Antwerp Rules 2016 (Comité Maritime International).

[16] West P&I, “Charterparty Considerations” and “The Strait of Hormuz: Guidance to Members” (March 2026).
https://www.westpandi.com/The-Straits-of-Hormuz-Guidance-to-Members

[17] London P&I Club, “Iran Conflict” (March 2026).
https://www.londonpandi.com/knowledge/news-alerts/iran-conflict

[18] BIMCO, “Remember the BIMCO War Risks Clauses” (3 March 2026).
https://www.bimco.org/news-insights/bimco-news/2026/03/03-war-risks/

[19] Squire Patton Boggs, “Refusing Transit Through the Strait of Hormuz” (March 2026).
https://www.squirepattonboggs.com/insights/publications/refusing-transit-through-the-strait-of-hormuz/

[20] Skuld, “Regional conflicts and their implications for charterparties” (12 August 2026).
https://www.skuld.com/topics/legal/pi-and-defence/regional-conflicts-and-their-implications-for-charterparties/

[21] Iranian Maritime Law of 1964 (1343 SH), provisions concerning the liability of carriers of goods, derived from the Hague Rules 1924.